Power after Rupture, and Redefining the Meaning of the Future

Aydin Areta

What had become visible after Iran’s most recent presidential election was that at least sixty per cent of Iranian society had no representative within the political structure and was unwilling to accept the options prepared in advance by power as representatives of itself. The meaning of this situation was the end of the reformist discourse and its rejection by the majority of society, even with the participation of that current’s candidate and the victory of that candidate.

From this point, the relationship between the majority of society and the ruling power reached a rupture, although this rupture does not by itself mean that governance has reached a complete dead end.
Governance can continue if:

- the unrepresented majority remains non-political and no shared action takes shape;

- narrative and cultural hegemony remain aligned with the government, whether through ideological alignment or through fear of insecurity and territorial fragmentation;

- economic conditions remain tolerable for the majority;

- no coherent opposition or leadership outside the structure emerges;

- no elite split develops within the ruling structure;

- the loyal minority remains organised and cohesive;

- and the apparatus of repression remains prepared and powerful.

Some of the apparent social freedoms seen after the Woman, Life, Freedom movement were, in the author’s interpretation, less an outcome of the movement than a limited and informal concession by the government intended to secure that first condition: keeping the ruptured and unrepresented majority non-political within the structure of power.

Gradually, however, the first four conditions collapsed:
- the economy reached a disastrous condition;
- society insisted upon a different political identity;
- narratives aligned with and stabilising the government weakened while an alternative discourse grew;
- and public acceptance of leadership outside the political structure of power increased.

From this stage, continuation of governance became possible only through retreat from a “discourse of legitimacy” toward a “logic of force,” relying on repression and on a cohesive supporting minority.

The bloody suppression of the Dey uprising, the text argues, will lead not to stability but to severe erosion of the government’s social capital and to rising costs of controlling society, while a declining economy will gradually erode elite loyalty. From this point onward, reformists are no longer an instrument for social control and for creating a form of controlled representation of the majority within the political structure. Instead, they become an unnecessary complication capable of increasing erosion within the ruling structure.

After the widespread killing in Dey, society entered a new stage that in the literature on social movements is described here as “suspension”: street action recedes, while beneath the surface of society networks of memory, mourning, narrative and small-scale connection begin to form. Emotions and narratives deepen and take root, and the cultural foundation of civil resistance becomes stronger.

Under these conditions, the government’s likely strategy is continual attack upon potential figures of social leadership. The broader a person’s popular base, the more complex the effort to discredit them becomes, relying upon the construction of discourse and the production of fear and doubt.

The text argues that almost no major sociological theory—from Weber’s legitimacy and Gramsci’s hegemony to Easton’s theory of support and Tilly’s conception of capacity—would regard the long-term stability of such a structure as likely, because the fundamental elements of legitimacy and support have been damaged.

Widespread repression also has deeper consequences:
- the rival discourse becomes more deeply rooted in the minds of the majority;
- society moves further toward a concentration of social leadership;
- collective grief becomes political capital, and dispersed anger moves closer to a capacity for coordination.

From this point onward, the question is no longer simply the number of protesters or the intensity of control. The question is whether the structure of power can create a horizon in which the majority are willing to recognise themselves.
The greatest failure of a government is to lose, in the minds of the majority, the struggle over the “meaning of the future.” The author’s argument is that this has now occurred.

This defeat will make attempts to recreate the first four conditions extremely difficult for the government.
Efforts will continue to depoliticise society and insist upon the narrative that everything is normal; to rebuild discourse and cultural hegemony and control narrative within society; to continue strategies that create an everyone-against-everyone atmosphere within the opposition; and to create minimally tolerable economic conditions. All of these will be attempted, but their effect will gradually become weaker and less effective and, even without an external attack, will fail to create a long-term horizon of stability.